Due, as an attachment, via the “Assignments” tool on Canvas, by 11:55pm
Monday, October 24 (in PDF or any format easily converted to PDF,
e.g. MSWord, OpenOffice, LATE X, RTF, plain text).
Answer any one of the questions listed below in 2–3 pages (double
spaced).
The questions are keyed to different sections of the reading, with the idea that
each question is raised most centrally in a certain section. However, you can and
should use material from anywhere in the text where it’s relevant to the
answer.
Because this is an exam rather than a paper, I will give priority to
accuracy over originality in grading. However, all the questions do require
some thought; they can’t simply be read out of the texts. Moreover, in
many (if not all) cases the “correct” answer is unavoidably a matter of
interpretation: in such cases it would be safest to reproduce what I said
in class, but it will also be acceptable if you’re clearly following some
other reasonable interpretation. And, of course, as usual, your answer
must be “original” in the sense that it is your own work. (If you use any
outside source — which I don’t especially recommend — you must cite
it.)
Since we read the B edition only, please base your answer on the B edition text
(where there are differences). You can cite it by the B-edition page number (e.g.,
“B112”).
You can find answers to some commonly asked questions about my
assignments and grading in my FAQ.
Questions
1.
(Preface) Consider the following two descriptions of “metaphysics”: (a)
metaphysics concerns our pure a priori knowledge about the world of
experience — that is, it concerns what we know about the objects of
experience, but not based on experience; (b) metaphysics concerns causes and
principles of the world of experience which are themselves outside the realm
of experience. Why does it seem that the outcome of this book will be positive
with respect to (a), telling us what we can hope to know about metaphysics
in that sense and how we can expect to know it, but completely negative with
respect to (b), telling us simply that we have no hope of such knowledge?
Why, according to Kant, do we nevertheless also obtain an important positive
outcome from the discussion of (b), as well?
2.
(Introduction) Using Kant’s example, “All bodies are extended,” explain
in two ways what it means to say that it is an analytic judgment: first way, by
thinking of judgments, in general, as the application of predicates to subjects
(so that the form of every judgment is something like “S is P”); second way,
by thinking of judgments in general as knowledge on a condition (so that the
form of every judgment is something like “Rule R holds on condition C.”).
Explain, in the same two ways, why “All bodies are heavy,” according to
Kant, is synthetic. Why does the understanding, in making a judgment of
this second kind (a synthetic judgment), require support from some other
thing (“= X”), something other than the concepts of the subject and the
predicate? What provides the external support in the case of an empirical
judgment such as “All bodies are heavy”? Why, then, is it surprising that
some synthetic judgments (according to Kant) are also a priori?
3.
(Aesthetic) Explain Kant’s distinction between (human) “intuitions” and
“concepts” (just in general: you needn’t discuss in detail the special case
of pure intuition). Address the fact that intuitions are singular, immediate,
passive representations and concepts general, mediate, active ones — how
are those characteristics related to one another? Why, according to Kant,
must knowledge of an empirical object involve both of these two types
of representation (intuitions and concepts)? What role is played by each?
Within the intuition, what is the role, specifically, of sensation? What is it
that “corresponds” to sensation?
4.
(Metaphysical Deduction) Using a simple empirical example (e.g., the
concept cinnabar, as discussed in class) explain how that concept must
represent its object if it is to be suitable as a subject for: (a) a universal
categorical judgment (e.g. “All cinnabar is red”); (b) a particular categorical
judgment (e.g. “Some cinnabar is shiny”); (c) a singular categorical
judgment (e.g. “This cinnabar weights 5 grams”). Assuming every empirical
concept must have these characteristics, why does this show that the three
moments of quantity (unity, plurality, and totality) are categories?