Due, as an attachment, via the “Assignments” tool on Canvas, by 11:55pm
Monday, October 18 (in PDF or any format easily converted to PDF,
e.g. MSWord, OpenOffice, LATE X, RTF, plain text).
Answer any one of the questions listed below in 2–3 pages (double
spaced).
The questions are keyed to different sections of the reading, with the idea that
each question is raised most centrally in a certain section. However, you can and
should use material from anywhere in the text where it’s relevant to the
answer.
Because this is an exam rather than a paper, I will give priority to accuracy
over originality in grading. However, all the questions do require some thought;
they can’t simply be read out of the texts. Moreover, in many (if not all) cases the
“correct” answer is unavoidably a matter of interpretation: in such cases it would
be safest to reproduce what I said in class, but it will also be acceptable if you’re
clearly following some other reasonable interpretation. And, of course, as
usual, your answer must be “original” in the sense that it is your own
work. (If you use any outside source — which I don’t recommend — you
must cite it.) To cite Schelling, please just give the page number in our
text.
You can find answers to some commonly asked questions about my
assignments and grading in my FAQ.
Questions
1.
(Introduction and Part One) Briefly describe the two “prejudices”
designated A and B on pp. 9–10. Explain why the first prejudice (A),
according to Schelling, is characteristic of a “theoretical” attitude or
standpoint (one in which we want to know and contemplate the truth); an
why the second prejudice (B) is characteristic of a “practical” attitude or
standpoint (one in which we want to decide how to act). What does each of
these prejudices say about the relationship between the subjective and the
objective: that is, between subject of presentations (that which represents)
and their objects (that which is represented)? If, as transcendental philosophy
contends, the highest principle of knowledge is “I = I” — a proposition in
thinking which I make myself into my own object — why is that likely to
overturn both prejudices?
2.
(Parts Two and Three) Why, according to Schelling, does being an object
entail finitude (that is: limitedness, being limited, being one thing and not
something else)? Hint: why does he say that “only that which is limited
me-ward, so to speak, comes to consciousness” (p. 44)? Explain why this
means, according to Schelling, that the ego (or “self”) is “originally” infinite,
but becomes finite through the act of intuiting itself? Why, as a result, does
the intuited ego feel itself affected by an alien force originating outside the
realm of presentations? What do we, the transcendental philosophers, say is
really affected the intuited ego?
3.
(Part Four) Consider the following paradox which Schelling puts forward
with respect to free action: “The contradiction here is that the act has
to be both explicable and inexplicable” (p. 159). Why must the free act
of an intelligence be “inexplicable” (through the previous state of that
intelligence)? Why must it be “explicable”? How is the existence of other
intelligences, who both (a) have rights against me and (b) demand of me that
I satisfy those rights, supposed to resolve the contradiction? (Note: although
I talked a lot about Leibniz while explaining this in class, you do not need
to discuss Leibniz in your answer.)