Popper, LSD, ch. 1 and 2: It is clear that, in these chapters, Popper
introduces three different questions: (1) the “problem of induction” (how can
we come to believe universal statements on the basis of finite empirical data);
(2) the “demarcation problem” (how can we distinguish science, properly
speaking — empirical science — from others things that look like science
but aren’t, such as pseudoscience, metaphysics, mathematics, etc.); and,
finally, (3) certain questions about the relationship between science and the
methodology of science, most importantly: is the methodology of science itself
science? But it is not clear which of those three questions is most important
to him. Choose one of the following three statements and explain how it could
be right (that is, give the details of what Popper would be thinking as he
connects one question to another in that way). (A) Popper’s main point is to
show that (1), the “problem of induction,” doesn’t have a positive solution,
and to explain how we can nevertheless learn something about universal
laws. He discusses (2), the “demarcation problem,” because of that main
point. (B) Popper’s main point is the role of falsifiability in answering the
“demarcation problem,” (2). He discusses other methodological issues, (3),
and the “problem of induction,” (1), because of that main point. (C) Popper’s
main point is (3), the relationship between science and the methodology of
science. He discusses the “problem of induction,” (1), and falsifiability as a
response to the “demarcation problem,” (2), because of that main point.
2.
Popper, LSD, ch. 3: Explain why Popper’s conception of a “theoretical
system” (§16) might lead one to regard the axioms as “conventions.” Your
explanation should involve (at least) the following: theories (what is a
“theory”?); axioms; definitions; “strict” universals. Explain, further, why
Popper wants to avoid that interpretation. How would someone who treats
the axioms that way, as conventions, respond to new data coming in? Why
would they never have to give up their theory?
3.
Popper, LSD, ch. 4: Explain one of the following points about Popper’s
view (all of which are correct): (a) No falsifiable theory forbids only a single
basic statement. (b) Forbidding (any number of) basic statements is not
enough to make a theory falsifiable. (c) A theory cannot, in general, be
falsified by a single accepted basic statement. (Note that (a), (b), and (c) are
three different things. You should choose only one and try to explain it.)
4.
Popper, LSD, ch. 5: What is “Fries’s Trilemma”? (Do not quote from the
text to answer this; you must explain in your own words. What happens when
we try to give a reason for believing every true statement?) How is Popper’s
view on “basic statements” supposed to resolve this trilemma? How is this
connected with his reason for rejecting all versions of “protocol sentences,”
including even the version Carnap (in “On Protocol Sentences”) claims to
have taken from Popper? That is: why, according to Popper, do all versions
of “protocol sentences,” as opposed to Popper’s “basic statements,” leave the
trilemma unresolved?
5.
Popper, LSD, ch. 10: Explain why Popper’s view, as opposed to the view
he describes as “inductivist,” makes it hard to understand why we relyon corroborated theories. That is: (1) Why would it be easy to see why
we should rely on well-corroborated (justified) theories? (2) Why is it hard
to understand why we should rely on well-corroborated (severely tested)
theories, according to Popper? And, (3) how would Popper respond to this
objection? (So note, no part of this question is about saying why Popper
rejects inductivism. Just take that for granted and explain why his rejection
of inductivism creates this specific problem for him, and how he thinks he
can deal with it.)
6.
Neurath, Putnam, Lakatos: Choose one of the following examples and
explain why (according to one or more of the three authors) it causes a
problem for Popper: Newton’s derivation of Kepler’s laws; the discovery
of Neptune; the orbit of Mercury. Why, according to the author(s) who
raise the objection, does the example you have chosen seem to show that
scientists theories are not falsifiable in the way he requires? How might
Popper respond? What would he say his critic(s) have missed either about
the example or about what his requirement of falsifiability actually entails?
7.
Kuhn, SSR, ch. 1–5: On p. 34, Kuhn claims that three activities
(“determination of significant fact, matching of facts with theory, and
articulation of theory”) make up all the experimental and theoretical work
of normal science. Choose one of these three activities and explain what it
is like, using examples where helpful. Then explain why, according to Kuhn,
someone could not, in general, be motivated to engage in this activity by a
desire to test theories, to uncover unexpected novelties, or to be useful. Why
does engaging in the activity imply that you do not think current theories
are false, do not think anything unexpected will turn up in the results? And
why, in general, is it clear that, in choosing to engage in this activity, we have
not chosen to answer a question because we expect the answer to be useful
(to society)? Explain, on the other hand, why, according to Kuhn, someone
could be motivated to engage in this activity by a desire to solve “puzzles.”
8.
Kuhn, SSR, ch. 6–8: Discuss either the discovery of oxygen or the
discovery of X-rays, focusing on the role of “anomalies” and the ways in which
the nature and role of such anomalies, according to Kuhn, are both like and
unlike the nature and role of falsifying instances/hypotheses as described by
Popper. Explain further how the process in question is supposed to resemble
the kind of “theoretical” crisis described in ch. 7.
9.
Kuhn, SSR, ch. 9–10: How might a “positivist” (as described by Kuhn,
beginning around p. 98) tell the story of Galileo’s discoveries about the
behavior of pendulums? How would such a positivist argue that these
discoveries were not incompatible with older theories? (See especially what
Kuhn finally notes on p. 124: that Aristotelians didn’t discuss swinging
stones at all.) Why is the positivist’s description wrong, according to Kuhn?
Give at least two reasons. (Discuss what goes wrong in this particular case,
but with reference to some of the supposed general facts about the “nature
and necessity” of scientific revolutions — to quote the title of ch. 9 — which
guarantee that all such stories will be wrong.)
10.
Kuhn, SSR, ch. 11–13: On p. 149, Kuhn says: “The laymen who scoffed
at Einstein’s general theory of relativity because space could not be ‘curved’
— it was not that sort of thing — were not simply wrong or mistaken.”
This might be taken to mean that laymen are better placed to criticize new
developments in science than we usually tend to think. Is that the moral
Kuhn would want us to draw? Explain why or why not.