quality | quantity |
becoming (third moment of being, §88) | continuous quantity |
true infinite (third moment of being-there, §95) | discrete quantity |
attraction (third moment of being-for-self, §98) | unity |
The three moments on the right are the moments of “pure quantity” (all described in §100, p. 160).
We might expect a correlation something like this given that pure quantity is the “frozen” unity of being and being-there, i.e. the collapse into a new immediacy of the “fluid” unity which constitutes being-for-self. In other words: the whole movement of the Quality section repeats itself, in “frozen” form, within pure quantity.
Explain in detail how, in each case, the quantitative moment is a quantitative version of the qualitative one. For example: explain how continuous quantity (that is, quantity regarded as both determinate and indeterminate, as having no stable stopping places within itself) is becoming regarded as characterizing a dimension in which determination can vary indifferently to the being of which it is a determination, and similarly for the other two pairs. (Hints: in the case of discrete quantity, remember that we are not talking about a particular discrete quantity, a number, but rather about, so to speak, discrete quantitativeness, what is common to all discrete quantities; with respect to unity, remember that attraction is the unity of one and many.)
Second, explain roughly how the judgment of the concept — a finite application of which, fully developed, would be “This house (being constituted in such-and-such a way) is good (i.e., a good house)” (§179; cf. the same example of a house, §99R, p. 158: a house remains a house if you make it bigger or smaller, but, this will be moment of measure: only within certain limits) — is a form of measure, and use that correlation to show why, according to Hegel, Protagoras’ position about qualities entails, or goes along with, moral relativism.
Essence as Ground | Doctrine of |
of Existence | the Concept |
identity | concept |
distinction | judgment |
ground | syllogism |
Within being the abstract form of the progression is an other and passing-over into an other; within essence [it is] shining within what is opposed; in the Concept it is the distinctiveness of the singular from the universality which, as such, continues itself into what is distinct from it, and is as identity with the latter. (§240, p. 306; translation slightly altered)
Explain, first, how the moments of pure quantity — continuity, discreteness, and unity (§§99–100) — are relevant here. In what way is the distinctness of the singular from the universal like the distinctness of unity from continuity? (Hint: continuity makes sense as the first moment of Quantity because it is completely indifferent to the (qualitative) determinations of the quantified “something”: insofar as something is continuously quantified, it is everywhere the same. But the quantitatively unified something has quantitative determinations to which the determination of unity is indifferent — however much of it is unified, is thereby the same. Where do the quantitative determinations come from? Where did the initial continuity go?)
Secondly, explain how this continuity is related to the freedom of the concept, understanding freedom both (a) as absence of external determination, per Spinoza’s definition (“That thing [res] is said to be free which exists [existit] from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone” [Ethics I, Def. 7].) and (b) as the expression of the will as such, the very nature of the willing, in a singular act (a conception apparently at odds with Spinoza’s: see the Scholium to Prop. 49 of Ethics II, “For we have shown that the will is a universal entity, or the idea whereby we explicate all particular volitions. So if they believe that this common or universal idea of volitions is a faculty …”). Bonus question: why might Kierkegaard (or his pseudonym) suggest that this understanding of freedom is inconsistent with the concept of an original sin, that is, of a sin committed by an innocent will?