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1.
- In the Remark to §125 (p. 195), Hegel discusses the difference between
“thing” (Ding), a determination of essence, and “something” (Etwas), a
determination of being (introduced in §90). How is the difference between
being and essence supposed to explain the difference between something’s
being determined by a quality (something as the unity of determination
and quality), on the one hand, and the thing’s having a property (thing
as the unity of ground and existence), on the other? (Hint: remember the
definition of “quality” as: “determination identical with being.”) Explain,
then, based also on the difference between mere transition (passing-over),
on the one hand, and “shining,” on the other, why the determination
following “something” is “limit” (§92), whereas the determination following
“thing” is “appearance.” In what sense is appearance to the thing as limit
is to something? Hint: “limit” is the determination in which something, as
determinate and therefore finite, is seen to depend on its pure negation:
the “spurious” (really, “bad”: schlechte) infinite which “is nothing but the
negation of the finite” (§94). The world of appearance “proceeds to an infinite
mediation of its subsistence by its form” (§132). How is the bad infinite as
world of appearance specifically suited to negate the finite as thing?
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2.
- Briefly explain: (a) in what sense the world of appearance is the
appearance of essence — that is, the way essence taken immediately (Essence
as the Ground of Existence) manifests itself, “shines” forth as appearance;
(b) in what sense the world of appearance, as the negation of essence, is not
the appearance of anything; (c) in what sense the world of appearance is
the appearance of actuality (of the actual) — the way actuality first appears
on the scene, so to speak. For all three of these you may find helpful the
Addition (Zusatz) to §131: for (a) especially towards the beginning; for (b)
and (c) especially the paragraph about Kant near the bottom of p. 200. For
(c) you may want to compare the “mutual externality” (Außereinander) of
the world of appearance (§133, p. 201) with the kind of relationships which
will be discussed under Actuality, e.g. cause and effect.
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3.
- Consider the following table:
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ground | mere possibility |
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existence | contingency |
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thing (Ding) | Thing (Sache) |
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Explain, based on the outline of the Doctrine of Essence as a whole, why we
expect to find a certain relationship between the items in the first column and the
corresponding items in the second column (note that in some cases a sub-moment
stands in for a whole development — justify this). How does each moment in
the second column differ from the one in the first? Explain how in each
case the difference results from the fact that the aspect of immediate
essence (essence as ground of existence) contained in the first column
has been united with appearance (has turned out to be its own mere
appearance).