Course Description
David Lewis (1941–2001) is by far the most important member of the school or
field now known as Analytic metaphysics, and, in my opinion, a very important
philosopher generally speaking. He is best known as a proponent of “modal
realism,” that is, the view that there (literally) are other possible worlds, besides
the actual one.
I have divided the reading into three parts, by a division whose validity I don’t
feel entirely certain about, but which seemed convenient. The first part
introduces modal realism and the other basic views which go along with it
to determine the structure of Lewis’s metaphysical system. The second
part focuses on Lewis’s thought about the nature of philosophical speech,
conversation, and argument, in part so we can see more clearly what he might
think he was doing, and why, in maintaining such views. The third part
introduces some less-basic metaphysical apparatus and applications of the
basic apparatus to specific topics, all centered around Lewis’s version
of the traditional metaphysical tasks, to provide a foundation for the
(special) sciences and demonstrate generally the possibility of language and
thought.
A good deal of mostly recent historical background would be helpful in
understanding better what Lewis is up to. I ended up limiting this, in the assigned
reading, to a few pieces by Carnap and Quine, but many of their other writings
would be relevant, in addition to the writings of many other recent philosophers
— Davidson, Goodman, Kripke, Montague, Putnam, and many others. I
will be semi-happy to suggest appropriate extra reading to interested
students.