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1.
- In The Friend, Essay IV in “Essays on the Principles of Method”
(p. 449–50), Coleridge compares a methodical person to “clock-work.” Of
course, a methodical person and a clock are both regular, but, Coleridge
says “the resemblance extends beyond the point of regularity.” In what other
way does a methodical person resemble a clock, according to Coleridge?
(Hint: how does a clock mediate between time and space, or in other words
between the internal and the external?). Coleridge adds, however, that this
comparison “yet falls short of the truth” about the methodical person. What
does the methodical person — a person with a “leading thought” (p. 455)
— do that a clock does not? (Hint: what does it mean for time, or thought
or speech, to be “organized”? What is an “organ”?)
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2.
- In Aids to Reflection, Introductory Aphorism XXIII (pp. 15–16),
Coleridge states that the truth of Christianity is to morality what morality
was to the “rites, ceremonies and ceremonial vestments” of Old Testament
religion. In other words, according to him: morality is an outward symbol
of something higher, namely faith, “the faith that looks down into the
perfect law of liberty” (p. 16). Then he comments, however, that this means
Christianity has a certain “distinguishing excellence,” namely that “the ritual
is of the same kind (ὁμοούσιον), though not of the same order, with the
religion itself” (17). In what way is the idea of something “looking down” into
(what is the same as) itself reminiscent of Schelling? (See also Introductory
Aphorism X, p. 5: “Self-superintendence! that any thing should overlook
itself! Is not this a paradox, and hard to understand?”) Explain how this
makes morality, for Coleridge, analogous to the work of artistic genius in
Schelling: a finite, external thing which nevertheless can serve to represent
the unity of the finite and the infinite. In particular: how is election (the
divine grace that acts within the will and enables the will to be perfect:
“Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect”
[Matthew 5:48]) similar to the “dark unknown force” of genius in Schelling
(System of Transcendental Philosophy, p. 222)?
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3.
- Explain what Coleridge means when he says that “original sin” actually
means the same thing as just “sin” ( “the phrase, Original Sin, is a Pleonasm,
the epithet not adding to the thought, but only enforcing it. For if it be Sin, it
must be original” [Comment to Aphorism X on Spiritual Religion, p. 261]).
Why, in what sense, are there no origins in nature, that is, in the object of
the understanding? (See p. 257.) Explain how this means that neither of the
following two people can sin: (1) a “maniac,” that is, someone who has lost the
power of “reason” — the power in us that is higher than the understanding
(see p. 262); (2) someone whose will is “uncorrupted,” that is, whose will
is not distinct from their reason (see Comment to Aphorism of Spiritual
Religion XV, p. 295). Why does this make corruption of the will, according
to Coleridge, analogous to the act of “separation” that begins transcendental
philosophy, according to Schelling? (See System of Transcendental Idealism,
pp. 8–9.)
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4.
- How is the theme of “self-reliance” in Emerson’s essay of that name, or
in other words the theme of “self-trust” (“Trust thyself: every heart vibrates
to that iron string,” p. 49) related to the concept of “self-consciousness” in
Schelling and/or of “reflection” or “self-superintendence” in Coleridge (Aids
to Reflection, p. 5)? There is obviously more to be said about this than you
could say in a 2–3 page paper; just point to a thing or two that seem especially
striking or unexpected. You may want to think about the concept of origin,
originality, the original (or “aboriginal”) self, which turns up importantly in
all three, but in somewhat different ways. (See especially the first sentence
of “Self-Reliance,” p. 47, and also p. 64; Aids to Reflection, p. 257 and
thereabouts; System of Transcendental Idealism, top of p. 24; p. 31; p. 36.)
In Emerson “original” is opposed to “conventional.” To what is it opposed
Coleridge see and/or in Schelling? But you needn’t focus on “originality” if
you have another idea.
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5.
- Assuming that Fuller’s contrast between “man” and “men” (in “The
Great Lawsuit”) is a version of Schelling’s contrast between the infinite,
representing self and the finite (limited), represented self (see System of
Transcendental Philosophy, around p. 40, and compare “the Great Lawsuit,”
p. 1: “It is known that his [i.e., man’s] inheritance consists in no partial
sway, no exclusive possession, such as his adversaries desire”) — what is
the effect (1) of making this a contrast between singular and plural and
(2) of suddenly bringing out (on p. 7) the implied contrast between “man”
and “woman”? Must we at that point take back the claim that “man’s”
inheritance is unlimited — because, after all, he will have to share it, not
with men (or women) but with “woman”? Or is there some other way to
understand what “man” is supposed to learn, upon reading the passage on
p. 7?
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6.
- Compare Fuller’s treatment of Hamlet, via her characters Laurie and
Aglauron (in the “Dialogue containing Sundry Glosses on Poetic Texts,”
pp. 158–63) to Coleridge’s treatment (The Friend, Essay IV in “Essays on
the Principles of Method,” pp. 451–5). Note that both allude to Horatio’s
line (quoted in full by Coleridge, p. 455): “It were to consider too curiously to
consider so,” and both apparently agree that Hamlet has a problem something
like this: “The moment he is left alone, his thoughts revert to universal topics”
(Fuller, p. 160). Are there nevertheless crucial and revealing differences?
(Note I don’t have anything specific in mind here. See what you can come
up with.)
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7.
- Try to describe, as carefully as you can in 2–3 pages, the difference
in “style” or “sound” between two of our authors (e.g., between Schelling
and Coleridge, or between Emerson and Fuller, or between Coleridge and
Fuller, etc.). Give examples if possible. There isn’t room here probably to
try explaining why these differences exist, but still try to focus on differences
that you suspect may have philosophical implications or motivations. If you
think an author actually describes some feature of their own style, you can
note that, as well.